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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (M.S.S.),1 raises interesting questions
concerning the effects of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (Charter)2 on decisions of governments of Member States of the
European Union (EU or Union), the relationship between the Charter and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention),3 and the relationship between the ECHR
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).4
II. FACTS ON WHICH THE ECHR JUDGMENT IS BASED
The judgment of the ECHR concerns an Afghan citizen ( “the applicant”
or “M.S.S.”), who left Afghanistan in 2008 and travelled to Greece via Iran
and Turkey.5 On December 7, 2008 in Greece (Mytilene), his fingerprints
were taken.6 He was then detained for a week and ordered to leave the
country.7 He left Greece without having applied for political asylum.8
After travelling through France, he applied for political asylum in
Belgium.9 However, after the Belgian authorities took his fingerprints it
became clear to them (via a Eurodac “hit” report)10 that the applicant had
1
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108. “The President of the Chamber
to which the case had been assigned acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name
disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).” Id. para. 1.
2
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83)
389 [hereinafter Charter].
3
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
4
See Gabriel M. Wilner, Reflections on Regional Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 407 (1996) (explaining the sources of law in regional human rights systems and
concluding that the regional enforcement of human rights in Europe and the Americas is based
on adjudicatory institutions which administer treaty-based rights).
5
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 9.
6
Id.
7
Id. para. 10.
8
Id.
9
Id. para. 11.
10
“Eurodac” was established on December 11, 2000 for the comparison of fingerprints for
the effective application of the Dublin Convention determining the State Responsible for
Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European
Communities (which was replaced in 2003 by the Dublin Regulation infra note 12). Council
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previously illegally crossed the border into Greece).11 On March 18, 2009,
the Belgian authorities (Aliens Office) requested the Greek authorities to
take charge of the asylum application, in accordance with Article 10(1)12 of
Regulation 343/2003/EC (the Dublin Regulation).13 The Dublin Regulation
has replaced the Dublin Convention determining the State Responsible for
Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the Member States of
the European Communities, signed in Dublin on June 15, 1990 (generally
known as the “Dublin Convention”).14 Hence the informal name of “Dublin
Regulation” for the regulation that replaced the Dublin Convention.
When the Greek authorities failed to reply within the two-month period of
Article 18(1)15 of the Dublin Regulation, the Belgian authorities took that as
tacit acceptance of their request, in accordance with Article 18(7)16 of the
Dublin Regulation.17
On May 19, 2009, the Aliens Office issued an order directing the
applicant to leave the country.18 He was taken into custody on the same
day.19 On May 27, 2009, the Aliens Office scheduled his departure for
Regulation 2725/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 316) 1 (EC).
11
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 12.
12
Council Regulation 343/2003, art. 10(1), 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Dublin
Regulation] (establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a
third-country national).
13
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 14.
14
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Community, Aug. 19, 1997, 1997
(C 254) 1 [hereinafter Dublin Convention].
15
Id. art. 18(1).
16
Id. art. 18(7).
17
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 14.
18
Id. para. 17. The judgment records that
[t]he reasons given for the order were that, according to the Dublin
Regulation, Belgium was not responsible for examining the asylum
application; Greece was responsible and there was no reason to suspect that
the Greek authorities would fail to honour their obligations in asylum matters
under Community law and the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees. That being so, the applicant had the guarantee that he would be
able, as soon as he arrived in Greece, to submit an application for asylum,
which would be examined in conformity with the relevant rules and
regulations. The Belgian authorities were under no obligation to apply the
derogation clause provided for in Article 3 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation.
Id.
19
Id. para. 18.
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Greece for May 29, 2009.20 On May 29, 2009, he filed an appeal with the
Aliens Appeals Board to have the order of the Aliens Board set aside.21 The
applicant’s lawyer did not attend the hearing scheduled on the same day
(May 29, 2009) and the application was rejected for failure to attend.22 The
applicant refused to board the aircraft and was again ordered to be detained.23
On June 4, 2009, the Greek authorities confirmed their responsibility
under Articles 18(7) and 10(1) of the Dublin Regulation to examine the
applicant’s asylum request and indicated that he was entitled to submit an
application for asylum when he arrived in Greece.24
After his departure date was rescheduled for June 15, 2009, the applicant,
through a new lawyer, filed a second request with the Aliens Appeal Board
to have the Belgian expulsion order set aside.25 This request was again
rejected26 but only after the applicant had already been transferred to Greece,
on June 15, 2009.27 Four days before the applicant’s transfer to Greece, he
applied to the ECHR, through his Belgian counsel for an order suspending
his transfer to Greece.28 The ECHR refused the application “but informed
the Greek [g]overnment that its decision was based on its confidence that

20
21

Id. para. 20.
Id. para. 21. The court summarized the reasons for the appeal as follows:
The reasons given, based in particular on Article 3 of the [European]
Convention, referred to a risk of arbitrary detention in Greece in appalling
conditions, including a risk of ill-treatment. The applicant also relied on the
deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece, the lack of effective access to
judicial proceedings and his fear of being sent back to Afghanistan without
any examination of his reasons for having fled that country.

Id.

22

Id. para. 22.
Id. para. 23. This “detention was upheld by order of the chambre du conseil of the
Brussels Court of First Instance.” Id. para. 25.
24
Id. para. 24.
25
Id. para. 27. The court described his reasoning saying that “[i]n addition to the risks he
faced in Greece, he claimed that he had fled Afghanistan after escaping a murder attempt by
the Taliban in reprisal for his having worked as an interpreter for the international air force
troops stationed in Kabul” and supported his claim by presenting certificates confirming the
interpreter role. Id. para. 32.
26
Id. para. 29.
27
Id. para. 33.
28
Id. para. 32 (discussing his reasoning for the appeal that “[i]n addition to the risks he
faced in Greece, he claimed that he had fled Afghanistan after escaping a murder attempt by
the Taliban in reprisal for his having worked as an interpreter for the international air force
troops stationed in Kabul” and that he presented certificates confirming his interpreter role).
23
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Greece would honour its obligations under the [European] Convention and
comply with EU legislation on asylum.”29
The applicant was transferred to Greece on June 15, 2009 and applied for
asylum upon arrival.30 The reception the applicant received was far from
pleasant. Four days after the applicant’s arrival in Greece, the applicant’s
Belgian lawyer received a message (subsequently relayed to the ECHR) that
upon arrival the applicant had immediately been placed in
detention in a building next to the airport, where he was locked
up in a small space with 20 other detainees, had access to the
toilets only at the discretion of the guards, was not allowed out
into the open air, was given very little to eat and had to sleep
on a dirty mattress or on the bare floor.31
The applicant was released on June 18, 2009, given an asylum seeker’s
card, and ordered to report within two days to the Aliens Directorate of the
Attica Police Asylum Department in Athens to provide his home address in
Greece, so that he could be kept informed of the progress in respect to his
asylum application.32 Since the applicant had no means of subsistence and
no address, he did not report to the Attica police headquarters, joined other
Afghan asylum seekers, and lived in a park in central Athens.33

29

Id. Specifically the ECHR wrote to the Government of Greece:
That decision was based on the express understanding that Greece, as a
Contracting State, would abide by its obligations under Articles 3, 13 and 34
of the [European] Convention. The Section also expressed its confidence that
your Government would comply with their obligations under the following:
- the Dublin Regulation referred to above;
- Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status; and
- Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers.
I should be grateful therefore if your Government would undertake to inform
the Court of the progress of any asylum claim made by the applicant in
Greece as well as the place of detention, if he is detained on arrival in Greece.

Id.
30
31
32
33

Id. paras. 33, 41.
Id. para. 34.
Id. para. 35.
Id. paras. 36–37.
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Apparently as a result of his lawyer’s further communication, the
Registrar of the Second Section of the ECHR, which decided on the
applicant’s earlier request for suspension of the Belgian expulsion order, sent
a letter to the Greek government to inquire about the applicant and requested
a reply by June 29, 2009.34 The Greek government apparently did not reply.
On July 2, 2009, the ECHR, by way of interim measure,35 ordered Greece
not to deport the applicant pending the outcome of the proceedings before
the ECHR.36 Subsequently, the Greek government informed the ECHR that
the applicant had applied for asylum, that the asylum procedure had been set
in motion, and that the applicant had failed to report to the Attica police
headquarters.37 “In the meantime the applicant’s counsel kept the [ECHR]
informed of his exchanges with the applicant.”38
On August 1, 2009, the applicant tried to leave Greece by plane and was
arrested at the airport while he was in possession of a false Bulgarian identity
card.39 He was detained again, and on August 3, 2009 he was sentenced by
the Athens Criminal Court to a suspended sentence of two months
imprisonment for attempting to leave Greece with false papers.40 On August
4, 2009, the Ministry of Public Order of Greece initiated an administrative
expulsion procedure.41 It released the applicant during the pending
procedure.42

34

Id. paras. 38–39.
Rule 39 (Interim Measures) provides:
1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a
party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to
the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in
the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings
before it.
2. Notice of these measures shall be given to the Committee of Ministers.
3. The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter
connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has
indicated.
European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, Rule 39 (Registry of the Court, Apr. 2011).
36
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, paras. 38–40.
37
Id. para. 41.
38
Id. para. 42.
39
Id. para. 43.
40
Id. paras. 44–45.
41
Id. para. 46.
42
Id.
35
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On December 18, 2009 and June 18, 2010, the applicant renewed his
asylum card at the Attica police headquarters.43 He also requested the
Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity to help him find a home.44 There
was some follow-up to this request, but the Greek authorities were not able
to contact the applicant in the absence of an address where he could be
contacted.45
On January 20, 2010, the decision to expel the applicant was revoked, due
to his application for asylum before his arrest.46
On July 2, 2010, the applicant failed to attend an interview at the Attica
police headquarters.47 Previously, he personally received notice (in Greek)
of this interview on June 21, 2010 and signed the notice in the presence of
his interpreter.48
Finally, the judgment quotes a message from the applicant to his lawyer
on September 1, 2010, in which he informed his attorney that he attempted to
leave Greece for Italy in order to find better conditions than in Greece and
not to have to live on the street.49 The applicant was stopped by the police in
Patras, taken to Salonika, and then taken to the Turkish border for
expulsion.50 At the last moment, however, the Greek police did not expel
him.51 According to the applicant, the expulsion did not occur because of the
presence of the Turkish police.52
III. THE JUDGMENT OF THE ECHR
The application in this case was filed against Belgium and Greece under
Article 34 of the European Convention53 on June 11, 2009, just before his

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. paras. 47, 50.
Id. para. 47.
Id. para. 49.
Id. para. 48.
Id. para. 51.
Id.
Id. para. 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
European Convention, supra note 3, art. 34.
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
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expulsion from Belgium to Greece on June 15, 2009.54 In respect of
Belgium the applicant alleged that his expulsion violated Articles 255 and 356
of the Convention. In respect of Greece, he alleged treatment prohibited by
Article 3. In respect of both Belgium and Greece he complained of the lack
of a remedy that would enable him to have his complaints examined, in
contravention of Article 1357 of the Convention.58 At the same time, the
applicant requested an order from the ECHR suspending the Belgian
expulsion order;59 however, this request was denied.60
The application was assigned to the Second Section of the ECHR.61 A
Chamber of that Section communicated the application to the governments
of Belgium and Greece on November 19, 2009.62 On March 16, 2010 the
Chamber (consisting of seven judges) relinquished jurisdiction in favor of
the Grand Chamber of the ECHR (consisting of seventeen judges), thereby
indicating the importance of the case in the jurisprudence of the ECHR.63
Following the submission of written observations by the applicant and the
defendant governments, a hearing took place on September 1, 2010.64 This
was around the time that the applicant was stopped by the Greek police
attempting to leave Greece for Italy and came close to being expelled to
Turkey.65
[European] Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
Id.

54

M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 31.
European Convention, supra note 3, art. 2 (“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by
law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”).
56
Id. art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”).
57
Id. art. 13 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”).
58
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 3.
59
Id. para. 31.
60
Id. para. 32.
61
Id. para. 4.
62
Id.
63
Id. The transfer of jurisdiction occurred pursuant to Article 30 of the European
Convention and Rule 72. Id. In accordance with Article 29(1) of the European Convention,
the Grand Chamber decided to examine issues of admissibility and the merits of the case
together. Id. para. 6.
64
Id. paras. 6–7.
65
Id. para. 53.
55
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The ECHR judgment of January 21, 2011, sitting in Grand Chamber,
found several violations:
(1) Greece violated Article 3 of the Convention, because of the conditions
of the applicant’s detention in Greece and the conditions under which the
applicant had to live in Greece pending the decision on his application for
political asylum.66
(2) Greece violated Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with
Article 3, “because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities’ examination
of the applicant’s asylum request and the risk he face[d] of being returned
directly or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious examination
of the merits of his asylum application and without having access to an
effective remedy.”67
(3) Belgium violated Article 3 of the Convention because the Belgian
authorities knew or ought to have known that the applicant had no guarantee
that his asylum application would be considered seriously by the Greek
authorities.68 Due to the knowledge of the Belgian authorities about the
situation in Greece, they should not have assumed that the applicant would
be treated in conformity with the standards of the Convention, but rather
should first have verified how the Greek authorities applied their legislation
on asylum in practice.69
(4) Belgium also violated Article 3 of the Convention by transferring the
applicant to Greece because “the Belgian authorities knowingly exposed him
to conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading
treatment.”70
(5) Belgium violated Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with
Article 3, because of the lack of adequate procedures for the applicant under
Belgian law that would offer a realistic opportunity to stop his deportation to
Greece.71

66

Id. paras. 234, 264.
Id. para. 321. The Court stated that there was no need for it to examine the applicant’s
complaints lodged under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2. Id. para. 322.
68
Id. paras. 358, 360.
69
Id. para. 359. The Court again stated that there was no need to examine the applicant’s
complaint under Article 2. Id. para. 361.
70
Id. paras. 367–368.
71
Id. paras. 385–396 .
67
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECHR JUDGMENT FOR THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM
What makes the case of M.S.S. interesting from an EU law point of view
is that the transfer of the applicant from Belgium to Greece was carried out
pursuant to a mechanism established under EU law. Therefore, the court
reviewed actions and decisions of Belgium and Greece that were taken in the
context of the “Dublin” asylum system of the EU.72
The Dublin Convention first set out the rules that determine which
Member State is responsible for examining an application for asylum filed by
a citizen of a third country.73 In 2003, the Dublin Convention was replaced
by the Dublin Regulation.74
Under Article 10(1) of the Dublin Regulation, when an asylum seeker
“has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air
having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered shall be
responsible for examining the application for asylum.”75 Under article 10(1),
Belgium relied heavily on the ‘Eurodac’ mechanism to establish that Greece
was the first Member State of the EU that M.S.S. had entered illegally.
Article 10(1) further provides that “[t]his responsibility shall cease 12
months after the date on which the irregular border crossing took place.”76
This entitled Belgium to request that Greece deal with the applicant’s request
for asylum, even though it was filed in Belgium.77 According to Article
19(1) of the Dublin Regulation, it is the responsibility of the Member State
where the asylum application was lodged (in this case Belgium) to notify the
applicant for asylum of its decision not to examine the asylum application
and of its obligation to transfer the applicant to the other Member State.78
Article 19(3) stipulates such transfer must occur within six months of the
acceptance of the request (in this case by Belgium) to the requested Member

72

Id. paras. 65–86.
Dublin Convention, supra note 14, art. 3.
74
Dublin Regulation, supra note 12, art. 1.
75
Id. art. 10(1).
76
Id.
77
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 24. Articles 17 and 18 of the Dublin Regulation
provide for notification by one Member State to another in such situations. Dublin
Regulation, supra note 12, arts. 17–18. Article 18(7) specifically provides that failure to reply
to such notification by the notified Member State is tantamount to accepting the request. Id.
art. 18(7).
78
Dublin Regulation, supra note 12, art. 19(1).
73
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(in this case Greece), subject to limited exceptions.79 In the case of M.S.S.,
Belgium complied with this deadline.80
There is no strict requirement under the Dublin Regulation for Member
States of the EU to transfer applicants for asylum from third countries to
another Member State that has been designated by the Regulation as being
responsible for examining the asylum application.81 This means that in the
case of M.S.S., Belgium could have examined the asylum application itself,
rather than opting to transfer the applicant to Greece. Also, Article 15(1) of
the Dublin Regulation allows any Member State, even if it is not responsible
under the Dublin Regulation, to bring family members and other dependent
relatives together on humanitarian grounds, based especially on family and
cultural considerations.82 Thus, Belgium retained considerable flexibility in
deciding how to deal with the applicant.
The case of M.S.S. was initiated before the Treaty of Lisbon amending
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community (Treaty of Lisbon) entered into force on December 1, 2009.83
The Treaty of Lisbon brought into force the amended version of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU)84 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU),85 which is the renamed and amended version of the
former Treaty establishing the European Community.86 As part of the new
TEU, the Charter acquired a new status because Article 6(1) of the TEU
provides that “[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7
79

Id. art. 19(3).
M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, paras. 24, 33 (stating that Greece confirmed their
responsibility to examine the applicant’s asylum request on June 4, 2009 and the applicant
was transferred to Greece on June 15, 2009).
81
Dublin Regulation, supra note 12, art. 3(2). The ECHR refers to this as the
“sovereignty” clause. M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 74.
82
Dublin Regulation, supra note 12, art. 15(1). The ECHR refers to this as the
“humanitarian” clause. M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108, para. 75.
83
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of
Lisbon].
84
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83)
13 [hereinafter TEU].
85
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
86
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24,
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33.
80
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December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which
shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”87 The Charter was
originally proclaimed as a political document on December 7, 2000 by the
European Parliament, the European Council, and the European
Commission.88 However, as of December 1, 2009, the Charter has enjoyed
the same legal status as the TEU and TFEU by virtue of Article 6(1) of the
TEU, which provides that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties [the TEU and TFEU].”89 While the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe90 would have included the Charter in the
Constitution itself, Article 6(1) of the TEU achieves the same result through
an incorporation by reference. This means that a written “Bill of Rights” has
become part of EU law, against which acts of EU institutions and Member
States can be reviewed. However, the Charter only addresses the Member
States when they are implementing Union law. 91
The revised TEU also requires the EU to become a party to the European
Convention.92 This has not yet happened as of the date of writing this
Article. Until recently, only Members of the Council of Europe could
become parties to the European Convention.93 However, Protocol No. 14,
87

TEU art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN MOVEMENT (May 2008), http://
www.euromove.org.uk/index.php?id=7015.
89
TEU art. 6(1) (“The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”).
90
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1.
91
Charter, supra note 2, art. 51(1) (“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They
shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union
as conferred on it in the Treaties.” (emphasis added)). Further, the TEU provides that “[t]he
provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined
in the Treaties,” and that “[t]he rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its
interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the
Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.” TEU art. 6(1).
92
TEU art. 6(2) (“The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s
competences as defined in the Treaties.”).
93
European Convention, supra note 3, art. 59(1) (“This Convention shall be open to the
signature of the members of the Council of Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.”). See also Statute of the
88
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which entered into force on June 1, 2010, allowed the EU to accede to the
European Convention.94 Once this happens, there will be a double system of
human rights protection in the EU. The Charter can be relied on in litigation
involving questions of EU law, both in actions brought directly before the
CJEU, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU (actions for judicial review),95 and in
proceedings before the CJEU, pursuant to requests for preliminary rulings
from the courts of the Member States under Article 267 TFEU.96 In addition,
the EU’s accession to the European Convention means that private parties
will have the right to allege non-compliance of the EU with its obligations
under the European Convention and to have such complaints adjudicated by
the ECHR.97 Assuming that the approach of Article 51 of the Charter will be
followed, acts of the Member States of the EU will also be covered by the
EU’s accession to the extent that the Member States implement Union law.
Although all Member States of the EU are already parties to the European
Convention in their own right, they might try to disclaim responsibility for
acts constituting violations of the European Convention when such acts are
required by EU law. The accession by the EU should take care of this.
The future accession by the EU to the European Convention also opens
the possibility of judgments of the CJEU being reviewed by the ECHR in
cases with alleged violations of the European Convention by institutions of
the EU or by the EU Member States (when implementing Union law).
Although there appears to be a strong institutional tendency in either court to
respect and apply each other’s jurisprudence,98 it remains to be seen if that

Council of Europe, art. 4, May 5, 1949, E.T.S. No. 1 (“Any European State which is deemed
to be able and willing to fulfill the provisions of Article 3 may be invited to become a member
of the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers.”).
94
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention art. 17, May 13, 2004, Council of
Europe T.S. No. 194 [hereinafter Protocol No. 14] (“The European Union may accede to this
Convention.”).
95
TFEU art. 263.
96
Id. art. 267.
97
See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 34 (“The [ECHR] may receive applications
from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in
any way the effective exercise of this right.”); see also id. art. 33 (indicating additional rights
of Parties to “refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the
protocols”).
98
See e.g., Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 2005-VI
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will be sufficient to avoid contradictory findings in all cases. The CJEU has
had a long tradition of relying on provisions of the European Convention and
the interpretation of the Convention by the ECHR in developing its
jurisprudence of “general principles of Union law,” which includes the
protection of human rights, under the rubric of “any rule of law relating to
[the] application of [the TEU and TFEU]” in the second paragraph of Article
263 TFEU.99 This line of jurisprudence has been equally applied by the
CJEU and in fact was started in deciding cases under Article 267 TFEU100
pursuant to requests for preliminary rulings from courts of the Member
States.101 Moreover, since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the CJEU
has in its arsenal the Charter as a legally binding instrument that has the
same legal status as the TEU and TFEU.102 To the extent that the European
Convention and the Charter overlap, the CJEU is instructed by Article 52(3)
of the Charter to give the Charter the same interpretation.103 These
provisions should help in avoiding “collisions” between the ECHR and the
CJEU.

Eur. Ct. H.R. 440 (concerning alleged violations of the property rights of Bosphorus, a
Turkish charter company, which leased tow aircraft owned by the Yugoslav national airline
JAT). In 1993, the European Community implemented U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia (at
that time consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) by EC regulation and as a result Ireland seized
the leased aircraft. Id. para. 23. The ECHR dismissed the complaint. Id. para. 167. The
Court of Justice of the European Communities (as it was then called) dealt with this case nine
years earlier under European Community law, on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the
Supreme Court of Ireland. Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v.
Minister for Transp., Energy & Commc’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-3953 (resulting in the Court of
Justice dismissing the claim).
99
TFEU art. 263. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council and
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I–6351.
100
TFEU art. 267.
101
See, e.g., Case 26/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419 (deciding under the
mechanism now found in article 267 TFEU, beginning the line of jurisprudence of the CJEU
that provides protection to human rights as part of general principles of Community/Union
law).
102
TEU art. 6(1).
103
Charter, supra note 2, art. 52(3) (“In so far as this Charter contains rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid
down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more
extensive protection.”).
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V. THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY THE CJEU IN TWO RECENT CASES WITH
FACTS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF M.S.S.
Very recently the CJEU had the opportunity, in its judgment in Cases C411/10 and C-493/10, of December 21, 2011, to deal with the same types of
issues, within the framework of EU law, as were previously addressed by the
ECHR in the case of M.S.S.104 Case C-411/10 involved a reference for a
preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales; Case C-493/10 involved a similar reference from the
High Court of Ireland. Before that, Advocate General Trstenjak delivered an
Opinion in Case C-411/10 on September 22, 2011.105 Although the
Advocate General’s opinions are advisory only and do not bind the CJEU,106
the CJEU in many instances follows the conclusions of those Opinions,
which turned out to be true in this case.
In both these cases, the CJEU was requested to interpret the following
provisions of EU law:107 Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, various
provisions of the Charter (Articles 1, 4, 18, 19(2) and 47)108 and Protocol
104

Joined Cases 411 & 493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t and M.E. v. Refugee
Applications Comm’r, paras. 34–50 (Dec. 21, 2011) (not yet reported) [hereinafter
Judgment], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=117
187&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=656108.
105
Case C-411/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, Opinion of the Advocate General
(Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsfcelex=62010
CC0411&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. Paragraph 7 of the Opinion refers to a parallel opinion
delivered by the Advocate General in Case C-493/10 on the same day as her opinion in Case C411/10. Id. para. 7. However, no such separate opinion was published on the website of the
CJEU.
106
See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 65
(3d ed. 2010); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 50 (7th ed. 2010);
DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 145 (2d ed. 2010) .
107
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 1.
108
Article 1: “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” Charter,
supra note 2, art. 1. Article 4: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” Id. art. 4. Article 18: “The right to asylum shall be
guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the
Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Treaties’).” Id. art. 18. Article 19(2): “No one may be
removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be
subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” Id. art. 19(2). Article 47: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in
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No. 30 (to the TEU and TFEU) on the application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United
Kingdom.109
The first case (C-411/10) concerned an asylum application filed by an
Afghan citizen (N.S.) in the United Kingdom (U.K.). This applicant passed
through Greece, without applying for asylum, before arriving in the U.K.,
where he made such an application, so that under the system of the Dublin
Regulation, the U.K. was entitled to request Greece to examine the asylum
application.110 The second case concerned five litigants, from Afghanistan,
Iran, and Algeria but not connected with each other.111 Each of them had
entered Greece illegally and had been arrested there.112 They subsequently
travelled to Ireland, where they applied for asylum.113 The Eurodac
system114 confirmed that the five applicants had previously been in Greece
but had not applied for asylum there.115 The central issue in both these
proceedings was the extent to which the United Kingdom and Ireland have
an obligation under EU law to make an assessment regarding whether
deportation to Greece would likely result in serious violations of
fundamental rights (an assessment that the ECHR ruled that Belgium should
have made in the case of M.S.S.) and, if so, not to deport the applicants to
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and
represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” Id. art. 47.
109
Protocol (No 30), On the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 313. The Czech
Republic was promised a similar “opt-out” from the Charter by the European Council in
October 2009 (at the time of the next revision of the TEU and TFEU resulting from one or
more accessions of new Members to the EU) as an inducement for Czech ratification of the
Treaty of Lisbon. Brussels European Council, 15265/09, Oct. 29–30, 2009, Presidency
Conclusions, Annex I, at 14. The Czech Republic was the last Member State of the EU to
ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. Treaty of Lisbon: In Your Country, EUROPA, http://europa.
eu/lisbon_treaty/countries/index_en.htm# (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
110
Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Dublin Regulation. The facts, the legal proceedings and
the questions asked by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales may be found in the
judgment of the CJEU. Judgment, supra note 104, paras. 34–50.
111
The facts, the legal proceedings and the questions asked by the High Court of Ireland
may be found in the judgment of the CJEU. Id. paras. 51–53.
112
Id. para. 51.
113
Id.
114
See supra text accompanying note 10.
115
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 51.
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Greece to have their applications for political asylum examined there. The
President of the CJEU decided to merge the written procedure of Case C411/10 with that of Case C-493/10 because of the similar subject matter in
these cases.116
The CJEU answered the questions put to it within the broader context of
relevant treaties and the EU’s Common Asylum System.117 As to the
relevant treaties, the CJEU referred to the Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees118 (known as the Geneva Convention) and the Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees119 (known as the 1967 Protocol).120 All Member
States are party to the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol; the EU is
not.121 However, Article 78 TFEU commits the EU to developing a common
policy on asylum, which must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention
and the 1967 Protocol, and Article 18 of the Charter provides for a right to
asylum with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention and the 1967
Protocol.122
As to the Common European Asylum System, which is currently based
on Articles 78 (prescribing a common asylum policy) and 80 (principle of
solidarity and fair sharing between the Member States) of the TFEU, the
CJEU mentioned the Dublin Regulation, Directive 2003/9 (laying down
minimum qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted)123 and Directive 2005/85
(on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status)124 as its component parts.125 In this context, the
116
Order of the President of the Court, Nov. 9, 2010, in accordance with Article 43 of the
Rules of Procedure. Judgment, supra note 104, para. 54.
117
Id. paras. 3–33.
118
Signed in Geneva, on 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 150, No.
2545 (1954), which entered into force on 22 April 1954.
119
Signed on 31 January 1967, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 606, p. 267, No. 8791
(1967), which entered into force on 4 October 1967.
120
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 3.
121
Id. para. 4.
122
Id.
123
Council Directive 2003/9, of 27 January 2003, laying down minimum standards for the
reception of asylum seekers, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18.
124
Council Directive 2005/85/EC, of 1 December 2005, on minimum standards on
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 2005 O.J. (L 326)
13, 13–34.
125
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 11.
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CJEU also mentioned Directive 2001/55/EC, of 20 July 2001 (on minimum
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences
thereof)126 and Regulation 2725/2000, which established the “Eurodac”
system.127
The CJEU first addressed the question (posed by the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales in Case C-411/10) whether the decision adopted by a
Member State on the basis of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation to
examine a claim for asylum which is not its responsibility under the criteria
of Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation falls within the scope of EU law for
the purposes of Article 6 TEU and Article 51 of the Charter.128 It answered
that question in the affirmative,129 primarily because Article 3(2) of the
Dublin Regulation constitutes “an integral part of the Common European
Asylum System provided for by the [TFEU] and developed by the European
Union legislature.”130 Thus a Member State exercising the power of Article
3(2) of the Dublin Regulation is in principle subject to the constraints of the
Charter. Next the CJEU examined a cluster of four questions, drawn from
Case C-411/10 and Case C-493/10: (1) whether the national authorities of the
Member State that is considering the transfer of an applicant for asylum
(transferring Member State) to another Member State that is primarily
responsible for the asylum application under Article 3(1) of the Dublin
Regulation (the receiving Member State), must first examine whether the
receiving Member State complies with the fundamental rights of the EU set
out in Directives 2003/9 (laying down minimum standards for the reception
of asylum seekers),131 2004/83 (on minimum standards for the qualification
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted),132 and 2005/85 (on minimum standards on procedures in
126
Council Directive 2001/55/EC, of 20 July 2001, on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing
the consequences thereof, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12, 12–23. Judgment, supra note 104, para. 12.
127
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 13.
128
Id. para. 54.
129
Id. paras. 64–69.
130
Id. para. 65.
131
Council Directive 2003/9, supra note 123.
132
Council Directive 2004/83/EC, of 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the
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Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status),133 and in the
Dublin Regulation itself;134 (2) whether any such obligation on the
transferring Member State would preclude the operation of a conclusive
presumption that the receiving Member State will observe the claimant’s
fundamental rights under EU law or the minimum standards required by the
three Directives concerned;135 (3) whether, if the receiving Member State is
found not to respect fundamental rights, the transferring Member State is
under an obligation to examine the asylum application itself under Article
3(2) of the Dublin Regulation;136 and (4) whether a provision of the domestic
law of a transferring Member State requiring that receiving Member States
be treated as “safe countries” is compatible with Article 47 of the Charter
(right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial).137 The CJEU decided that
these questions should be considered together.138
The CJEU took as its starting point held that the Common European
Asylum System “was conceived in a context making it possible to assume
that all the participating States, whether Member States or third States,139
observe fundamental rights, including the rights based on the Geneva
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and on the [European Convention], and
that the Member States can have confidence in each other in that regard.”140
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons
who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, 2004
O.J. (L 304) 12, 12−23.
133
Council Directive 2005/85/EC, supra note 124.
134
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 70.
135
Id. para. 71.
136
Id. para. 72.
137
Id. para. 73.
138
Id. para. 74.
139
The European Community (as it then was) concluded an Agreement with Iceland and
Norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for
examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or Iceland or Norway. Id. para. 25.
Similarly, the European Community has concluded an Agreement with Switzerland
concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a
request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland, and a Protocol to that
Agreement between the European Community and Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Id.
para. 26. Denmark is not bound by the Directives making up the Common European Asylum
Policy but concluded an Agreement with the European Community by which it extended the
application of Regulation 2725/2000 (establishing Eurodac). See supra text accompanying
note 10. Judgment, supra note 104, para. 25. Also, the Dublin Regulation does not apply to
Denmark. Council Directive 2003/9/EC (laying down minimum standards for the reception of
asylum seekers) does not apply to Ireland. See id. para. 23.
140
Judgment, supra note 104, para. 78.
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The CJEU considered “it not however inconceivable that the system may, in
practice experience major operational problems in a given Member State,
meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum seekers may, when
transferred to that Member State be treated in a manner incompatible with
their fundamental rights.”141 The CJEU made it clear, however, that it would
not be compatible with the aims of the Dublin Regulation if the slightest
infringement of Directives 2003/9, 2004/83, or 2005/85 by the receiving
Member State were to be sufficient to prevent the transfer to that Member
State.142
The CJEU takes a different approach to cases in which “there are
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum
procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member
State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the
meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the
territory of that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that
provision.”143 Article 4 of the Charter provides: “No one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”144 Article 4
of the Charter is identical to Article 3 of the European Convention. In this
context the CJEU specifically referred to the findings of the ECHR in the
M.S.S. case as follows:
In a situation similar to those at issue in the cases in the main
proceedings, that is to say the transfer, in June 2009, of an
asylum seeker to Greece, the Member State responsible within
the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003, the European Court
of Human Rights held, inter alia, that the Kingdom of Belgium
had infringed Article 3 of the ECHR, first, by exposing the
applicant to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the
asylum procedure in Greece, since the Belgian authorities knew
or ought to have known that he had no guarantee that his
asylum application would be seriously examined by the Greek
authorities and, second, by knowingly exposing him to
conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to
degrading treatment (European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S.
141
142
143
144

Id. para. 81.
Id. para. 84.
Id. para. 86.
Charter, supra note 2, art. 4.
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v. Belgium and Greece, § 358, 360 and 367, judgment of 21
January 2011 . . . .145
The CJEU added that “[t]he extent of the infringement of fundamental rights
described in that judgment shows that there existed in Greece, at the time of
the transfer of the applicant M.S.S., a systemic deficiency in the asylum
procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers.”146 The CJEU
also stated that “information such as that cited by the [ECHR] enables the
Member States to assess the functioning of the asylum system in the Member
State responsible, making it possible to evaluate [the] risks [of violations of
fundamental rights].”147 The CJEU concluded:
In situations such as that at issue in the cases in the main
proceedings, to ensure compliance by the European Union and
its Member States with their obligations concerning the
protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers, the
Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer
an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State responsible’ within the
meaning of [the Dublin Regulation] where they cannot be
unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and
in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member
State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article
4 of the Charter.148
In such a situation, the transferring Member State, subject to its right to
examine the asylum application itself (pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Dublin
Regulation), must examine if Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation makes
another Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum
application, other than Greece (which would normally be responsible
pursuant to Article 10(1)), bearing in mind that Article 5(1) of the Dublin
Regulation provides that the criteria of Chapter III apply in the order in

145
146
147
148

Judgment, supra note 104, para. 88.
Id. para. 89.
Id. para. 91.
Id. para. 94.
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which they are set out in that chapter.149 If no other Member State is
responsible under Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation, then Article 13
provides that “the first Member State with which the application for asylum
was lodged shall be responsible for examining it.”150 The CJEU further
cautioned that the Member State in which the asylum seeker is present must
“ensure that it does not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of
that applicant have been infringed by using a procedure for determining the
Member State responsible which takes an unreasonable length of time,” and
that “[i]f necessary, that Member State must itself examine the application in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 3(2) of [the Dublin
Regulation].”151
Not surprisingly, the CJEU also held that “an application of [the Dublin
Regulation] on the basis of the conclusive presumption that the asylum
seeker’s fundamental rights will be observed in the Member State primarily
responsible for his application is incompatible with the duty of the Member
States to interpret and apply [the Dublin Regulation] in a manner consistent
with fundamental rights”152 and that any such presumption created by the law
of a Member State must be regarded as rebuttable.153 The same is true for
any conclusive presumption in the law of a Member State that certain States
are “safe third countries.”154
One question asked by the Court of Appeal (England and Wales), in Case
C-411/10, concerned the scope of the protection of fundamental rights in
relation to the Dublin Regulation under EU law, by virtue of general
principles of EU law and, in particular, Articles 1 (on human dignity), 18 (on
the right to asylum) and 47 (on the right to an effective remedy), and under
the European Convention. Specifically the Court of Appeal asked whether
the protection provided by EU law is wider than that conferred by Article 3

149

Id. paras. 95–96.
Id. para. 97.
151
Id. para. 98.
152
Id. para. 99, referring to para. 131 of the Opinion of the Advocate General; see also id.
para. 106.
153
Id. para. 104; see also id. para. 100.
154
Id. paras. 101–104. The CJEU pointed out, in paragraph 102, that “Article 36 of
Directive 2005/85, concerning the safe third country concept, provides, in paragraph 2(a) and
(c), that a third country can only be considered as a ‘safe third country’ where not only has it
ratified the Geneva Convention and the [European Convention] but it also observes the
provisions thereof.” Id. para. 102.
150
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of the European Convention.155 The CJEU was reluctant to answer this
question in the abstract and tied its answer firmly to the facts of the cases
before it. It restated its earlier conclusion that “a Member State would
infringe Article 4 of the Charter [which is identical to Article 3 of the
European Convention] if it transferred an asylum seeker to the Member State
responsible within the meaning of [the Dublin Regulation] in the
circumstances described in paragraph 94 of the present judgment,” i.e.,
where the transferring Member State “cannot be unaware that systemic
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of
asylum seekers in [the receiving] Member State amount to substantial
grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4
of the Charter.”156 After that, it stated tersely that “Articles 1, 18 and 47 of
the Charter do not lead to a different answer than that given [to the previous
questions].”157
Finally, the CJEU held, in answer to a specific question from the Court of
Appeal (England and Wales), that Protocol No 30 does not affect its answers
in relation to the United Kingdom. Specifically, the CJEU noted that Article
1(1) of the Protocol provides “that the Charter is not to extend the ability of
the Court of Justice or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United
Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations administrative provisions,
practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with
the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it affirms.”158 The
CJEU cited with approval the interpretation of that provision by the
Advocate General to the effect that “Protocol (No 30) does not call into
question the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland,
a position which is confirmed by the recitals in the preamble to that
protocol.”159 The CJEU concluded that “Article 1(1) of Protocol (No 30)
explains Article 51 of the Charter with regard to the scope thereof and does
not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the
obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court
of one of those Member States from ensuring compliance with those

155
156
157
158
159

Id. para. 109.
Id. para. 113, referring to paras. 94–106.
Id. paras. 114–115.
Id. para. 118.
Id. para. 119 (citing paras. 169–170 of the Advocate General’s Opinion). TEU art. 6(1).
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provisions.”160 However, the CJEU left open the possibility that its answer
might be different with regard to rights contained in Title IV of the Charter
and stated that there was no need to rule on the interpretation of Article 1(2)
of Protocol No 30.161
The mechanism of Article 267 TFEU leaves it to the court of a Member
States to apply the ruling of the CJEU in response to its questions about the
interpretation of EU law, to the facts before it.162 The judgment of the CJEU
in Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 requires the courts of the United Kingdom
and Ireland to make a determination whether they have substantial grounds
for believing that the asylum seekers would face a real risk of being
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4
of the Charter if they were transferred to Greece. The judgment of the CJEU
itself contains significant references to the judgment of the ECHR in the
M.S.S. case, including to the documentary evidence on the basis of which the
ECHR found that “the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known that
[M.S.S.] had no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously
examined by the Greek authorities” and that they knowingly exposed him to
conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading
treatment.163 In light of this recent evidence compiled in the M.S.S. case and
the references in the CJEU to the serious systemic problems in Greece164 it
appears almost inevitable that the courts of the United Kingdom and of
Ireland will stop the transfer of the asylum seekers concerned to Greece.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the judgment of the ECHR in M.S.S. and that of the
CJEU in Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 shows the direct impact of the
jurisprudence of the ECHR on the CJEU in the development of its
jurisprudence in respect of the protection of fundamental rights in relation to
the Dublin Regulation in the post-Lisbon era. Although the two courts
performed different functions in the cases being compared, i.e., the ECHR
adjudicating the validity of a complaint about violations of the European
160

Judgment, supra note 104, para. 120.
Id. para. 121.
162
See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 317–18 (2010).
163
Judgment, supra note 104, paras. 87–90.
164
Interestingly, the Advocate General’s Opinion contains a section entitled “The
overloading of the Greek asylum system.” Id. paras. 99–105.
161
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Convention, and the CJEU responding to requests from two courts of two
different Member States for interpretations of provisions of EU law, the
central issue before them was the same, i.e., whether the protection of
fundamental rights in Europe necessitated stopping the transfer of applicants
for asylum to Greece, being the country that was primarily responsible for
the examination of the asylum application in all these cases under the Dublin
Regulation.
The similarity of the approaches taken by the two courts was to be
expected on the basis of the mutual respect they had shown for each other’s
case law in the past. In the post-Lisbon era, the respect of the CJEU for the
jurisprudence of the ECHR was further reinforced by Article 52(3) of the
Charter, which requires that “[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.” Given
the significance of the text of Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the
European Convention and Article 4 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading punishment) of the Charter in these cases, the similarity of the
approaches of the two courts makes eminent sense.
When the EU becomes a party to the European Convention in its own
right, there will be a need to delineate the spheres of responsibility of the
Union and of the Member States under the European Convention. It now
appears likely that a new paragraph 2.c in an amended Article 59 of the
European Convention will circumscribe the legal responsibility of the EU
under the European Convention as follows:
Accession to the Convention and the Protocols thereto shall
impose on the European Union obligations with regard only to
acts, measures or omissions of its institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies, or of persons acting on their behalf. Nothing in the
Convention or the Protocols thereto shall require the European
Union to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no
competence under European Union law.165

165
Through the “Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” which is Part I
of the Appendix to the Report by the Steering Committee on Human Rights (of the Council of
Europe) to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments for the
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Because the acts of the Member States when implementing EU law are not
included in the responsibility of the EU under the European Convention
(unlike what Article 51(1) of the Charter stipulates) the ECHR will not need
to address the question of whether a Member State acted in its own right or
to implement Union law in specific instances. For procedural purposes
under the European Convention, it seems likely that a “co-respondent
mechanism” will be created, which will make it possible to join the EU as a
co-respondent to cases brought against Member States and vice versa. That
will also make it unnecessary for the ECHR to determine whether in specific
cases the EU or one or more Member States is responsible.166

accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, October 14,
2011, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-UE_
MeetingReports/CDDH_2011_009_en.pdf.
166
Through amendments to Article 36 of the European Convention, contained in the “Draft
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of
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Appendix, entitled “Draft Explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the
European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,” paras. 31–54, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CD
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